

January 10, 1962

## Subject: Bloc Military Aid to the Castro Regime

More than a year the Sino-Soviet bloc has supplied the Castro regime with large scale military assistance. Bloc military deliveries, primarily from the USSR and Czechoslovakia, have included a wide assortment of land armaments ranging from small arms through heavy tanks. Bloc aircraft supplied to Cuba include MIG jet fighters, helicopters, transporters, and trainers; jet bombers may also be provided. Extensive military training has been provided both in the bloc and in Cuba. Communist military aid has turned the Cuban military establishment into one of the most formidable in Latin America, and it has introduced a military capability hitherto lacking in the Caribbean area.

The Soviet Union at first moved cautiously in responding to Cuban requests for military assistance, probably out of deference to the priority of maintaining a climate for negotiations at the Paris Summit. Once underway, however, the Cuban military buildup proceeded rapidly. This support has aided the Castro regime in suppressing dissident and military movements and in consolidating its control over the Cuban people while the task of converting the island into a base for Communist operations in the rest of Latin America is carried out.

To a considerable degree the bloc has committed its prestige to the maintenance of the present regime, and Moscow probably will continue to provide military equipment and training to help uphold this commitment. For the past several months the bloc's military aid program in Cuba has been concerned primarily with training, supplying new equipment, and consolidating the Cuban military establishment along bloc organizational lines. New deliveries of arms are probably now underway.

### Background

The January attempt to overthrow Soviet bloc arms was initiated by the Castro government as early as 1959, but no firm military aid pact was concluded until the summer of 1960. The USSR's final response to Cuban gestures for cooperation in the military field was largely the result of Soviet uncertainty over the future course of the Cuban revolution. As Moscow's efforts to increase military equipment in the past became increasingly difficult through 1959 and early 1960, Cuban purchasing missions turned frequently to the bloc to investigate new sources of supplies. The mission reportedly covered a whole range of equipment from small arms to modern jet aircraft.

From the time of Mikoyan's trip to Cuba in February 1960, when the USSR abandoned the former ally's former stance in favor of all out propaganda support and extensive economic aid, Moscow appeared willing to move toward a major arms deal on terms the Cubans desired. Part of the initial hesitancy of the Cuban revolution in the rest of Latin America, the Soviet Union declined to grant the commitment to Castro and around the engine's "revolution" rather than allow an extension in which, but for the grace of God, the United States through intermediaries, acting in which case, Mikoyan's visit resulted in the breaking of a massive trade and aid program which gained momentum through 1960 and 1961. Cuban relations deteriorated.

With the collapse of the East-West summit meeting in May 1960 and the sharp setbacks in Soviet relations with the United States, many of the former Soviet inhibitions about providing military aid to Cuba were removed and a vigorous drive was launched to associate the bloc more closely with the Castro regime. This drive reached a peak with Soviet attacks on the Monroe Doctrine and assurances of support in the event of US military action against Cuba. These assurances, including Khrushchev's ambiguous references to retaliation with missiles, were offered in general terms intended to cover the supply of military aid in the form of equipment and technical assistance, without committing the USSR to specific moves in support of Cuba.

Military negotiations with the USSR and Czechoslovakia in 1960 were followed up by a well publicized trip to Prague and Moscow by Raul Castro, which probably was the occasion for the conclusion of secret arms deals. By August, Czech small arms were being issued to some Cuban militia units, and in the autumn the first major shipments of Communist arms began arriving in Cuba.

### Scope of Bloc Military Aid

From the autumn of 1960 until the late summer of 1961, bloc arms deliveries were made regularly to Cuban ports. No financial information on the bloc's arms deals with Cuba has been disclosed, but it is estimated that on the order of \$100,000,000 worth of equipment and technical assistance has been provided. In addition, large numbers of vehicles and other military-related items have been delivered, which contribute either directly or indirectly to Cuba's military potential. Moreover, several hundred Cuban military personnel have received training, including pilot training, in the bloc.

Because of the secrecy which has surrounded the Cuban military buildup, information on the exact quantities of bloc material is fragmentary. On 1 January 1961, during a military parade celebrating the second anniversary of Castro's takeover, Cuba unveiled an array of military hardware indicative of deliveries up to that time. Units equipped with medium and heavy tanks, assault guns, artillery, antiaircraft weapons, and mortars, as well as rifles and machine guns, were featured prominently. Since then, large additional amounts of land armaments have been supplied, along with F-4 jet fighters and other equipment.

Since the end of August 1961 the focus of the bloc's military aid to Cuba has been on assimilation of new equipment, intensive training, and completion of the reorganization of Cuba's military establishments. Further military shipments to Cuba may include bombers, naval craft, and possibly short-ranged tactical guided missiles.

The capabilities of the Cuban ground forces have increased steadily since the introduction of bloc equipment and training in the autumn of 1960. Estimates of the size of the ground forces range from 250 to 400 thousand. All units are equipped with bloc small arms and many have heavier equipment

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...aid is strongly reflected in Cuba's ground forces organization with emphasis that of the West European satellite.

Soviet bloc arms aid has given the Cuban ground forces an armored, artillery, antiaircraft, and antitank capability largely lacking in the past and unknown to other countries of the Caribbean area. Hundreds of bloc transport vehicles have greatly increased the mobility of Cuban forces. Thousands of Soviet bloc anti-aircraft arms have been delivered, enhancing the regime's guerrilla defense capabilities and enabling it to engage older non-bloc weapons for extensive operations in other countries. Soviet bloc instructors have been used extensively for training purposes and they serve as full-time advisors to some individual units. Under continuous bloc tutelage the combat effectiveness of the Cuban ground forces probably has risen to where it surpassed that of most other Latin American countries. In addition, bloc aid is helping the Cuban regime develop a body of well-trained military cadres which ultimately could be used to lead or support Communist guerrilla actions in the rest of Latin America.

Some Chinese Communist weapons have been supplied to the Cuban ground forces but the extent of Beijing's activity in the military aid field is unclear.

The capabilities of the Cuban air force declined sharply following Castro's takeover as a result of purges and destruction of key personnel. One of the major goals of the new regime, however, was to acquire Soviet jet aircraft, and most of the Cuban military budget has gone to the bloc in the summer of 1960 to acquire air vehicles. Their training has been one of the most important tasks of the Cuban military aid program. Cuban pilots have now returned to Cuba where they are continuing instruction on MIG jet fighters which arrived last summer. The bloc has also supplied biplanes, piston-engine fighters, and some simple engine transporters. About a dozen MiG biplane trainers have been delivered this summer for the Cuban jet pilots. There are some indications that Cuba may acquire Soviet jet bombers, but there have been deliveries so far.

The Cuban navy has not yet received any significant bloc military assistance. A few motor launches have been equipped with bloc antiaircraft guns, but no major warships have been delivered. Although no large-scale training programs for Cuban naval personnel have been released, the USSR probably will provide some training to Cuba.

Naval arms and military equipment supplied to Cuba:

Type of Equipment	Estimated Quantity
MIG jet fighters	10-12
Biplanes and heavy bombers	10-12
Antiaircraft guns	100-150
Field artillery	100-150
Antiaircraft missiles	100-150
Artillery	100-150
Trucks and other vehicles	100-150

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The Soviet Union at first moved cautiously in responding to Cuban requests for military assistance, probably out of deference to the priority of maintaining a climate of negotiations at the Paris summit. Once underway, however, the Cuban buildup proceeded swiftly. Bloc support has aided the Castro regime in suppressing the [illegible] movement and in consolidating its control over the Cuban people while the work of converting the island into a base for Communist operations in the rest of Latin America is carried out.

To a considerable degree the Bloc has committed its prestige in the maintenance of the present regime and [illegible] probably will continue to provide military equipment and training to help uphold this commitment. For the past several months the bloc's military aid program in Cuba has been concerned primarily with training, assimilating new equipment, and remolding the Cuban military establishment along bloc organizational lines. New deliveries of arms are probably underway.

### Background

Preliminary attempts to procure Soviet bloc arms were initiated by the Cuban government as early as 1959, but no firm military aid pacts were concluded until the summer of 1960. The USSR's cool response to Cuban gestures for cooperation in the military field was largely the result of Soviet uncertainty over the future [illegible] of Cuban [illegible]. As [illegible] efforts to procure military equipment in the West became increasingly difficult through 1959 and early 1960, Cuban purchasing missions traveled frequently to the bloc to investigate new sources of supply. Discussions reportedly covered a whole range of equipment from small arms to modern jet aircraft.

[Illegible] at the time of Mikoyan's trip to Cuba in February 1960, when the USSR abandoned its former [illegible] toward Cuba in favor of [illegible] propaganda support and extensive economic aid [illegible] appeared unwilling to move toward a major arms [illegible] Cuban desires. [5 lines illegible] Mikoyan's visit signalled the beginning of a massive bloc trade and aid program which gained momentum throughout the 1960's as U.S. - Cuban relations deteriorated.

With the collapse of the East-West summit meeting in May 1960 and the sharp setbacks in Soviet relations with the United States, many of the former Soviet inhibitions about providing military aid to Cuba were removed and a vigorous drive was launched to associate the bloc more closely with the Castro regime. This drive reached a peak with Soviet attacks on the Monroe Doctrine and assurances of support in the event of US military action against Cuba. These assurances -- including Khrushchev's ambiguous references to retaliation with missiles -- were offered in general terms intended to cover the supply of military aid in the form of equipment and technical assistance, without committing the USSR to specific moves in support of Cuba.

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Because of the secrecy which has surrounded the Cuban military buildup, information on the exact quantities of bloc material is fragmentary. On 1 January 1961, during a military parade celebrating the second anniversary of Castro's takeover, Cuba unveiled an array of military hardware indicative of deliveries up to that time. Units equipped with medium and heavy tanks, assault guns, artillery, antiaircraft weapons, and mortars, as well as rifles and machine guns, were featured prominently. Since then, large additional amounts of land armaments have been supplied, along with MiG jet fighters and other equipment.

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The capabilities of the Cuban air forces declined sharply following Castro's takeover as a result of purges and defections of key personnel. One of the major goals of the new regime, however, was to acquire combat jet aircraft and most of the Cuban military trainees who went to the bloc in the summer of 1960 were air cadets. Their training has been one of the most important tasks of the bloc's military aid program. Cuban pilots have now returned to Cuba where they are continuing instruction on MiG jet fighters which arrived last summer. The bloc has also supplied helicopters, piston-engine trainers, and small single-engine transports. About a dozen IL-14 twin engine transports were delivered this autumn for the Cuban civil airline. There are some indications that Cuban may receive Soviet jet bombers, but none have been delivered so far.

The Cuban Navy has not yet received any significant bloc military assistance. [Illegible] Cuban vessels have been equipped with bloc antiaircraft guns, but no [illegible] ships have been delivered. Although no large scale training programs for Cuban naval personnel have been disclosed, the USSR secretly[?] will provide some vessels to Cuba.

#### Bloc arms and military equipment supplied to Cuba:

Type of Equipment	Estimated Quantity
MiG Jet Fighters	50-100
Medium and Heavy tanks	[illegible]
Assault guns	0-10
Field artillery	500-1000
Antiaircraft artillery	500-1000
Mortars	[illegible]
Small arms	200,000
Trucks and other vehicles	4,000